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IMMIGRATON LAw-DEPORTATION: WHAT FIRAuD HATH BROUGHT
TOGETHER LET No MAN PUT AsuND=-Muslemi v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 408 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1969).
Petitioner, an alien, entered the United States on a temporary
visitor visa after being denied an immigrant visa because the quota
for his country was oversubscribed.1 Five days after he was notified
that deportation proceedings were being initiated against him due to
expiration of his visa, petitioner married a United States citizen.
His petition for permanent residence on the basis of that marriage was
granted by a special inquiry officer,3 but the decision was reversed
by the Board of Immigration Appeals [hereinafter referred to as the
Board] . Petitioner moved for reconsideration urging that his deporta-
tion be suspended pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (1964), which
provides that an alien married to a United States citizen and "other-
wise admissible at time of entry" shall not be deported for gaining
entry to this country by misrepresentation or fraud.5 This motion
was denied by the Board. His deportation was based on the charge
that, because of his intention to remain here permanently, he was
excludable at the time of entry as an immigrant without a valid im-
migrant visa. The Board held that this charge did not directly result
1. Muslemi was a native of India and a citizen of Iran. The quotas of both countries
were oversubscribed at the time of his application. Matter of Muslemi, 12 I. & N. Dec.
249 (1967).
2. Muslemi and his wife met in India while he and her then-husband were employed
by the Bank of America. Because she was already married, they devised a plan whereby
she would accompany him to the United States if he could obtain a visitor visa. After
she obtained a divorce and they were married, he would petition for permanent resi-
dence on the basis of that marriage. Id. at 250-51.
3. Immigration and Nationality Act § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (Supp. IV, 1968), amend-
ing 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1964), provides in part that the Attorney General has the dis-
cretion to change the status of a visiting alien to that of an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence if the alien who makes the application is eligible to have an
immigrant visa and the immigrant visa is immediately available.
4. The Board based its decision on the ground that the petitioner's fraudulent con-
cealment of his intention to remain permanently in the United States rendered him in-
eligible for favorable discretionary relief pursuant to § 1255. 12 I. & N. Dec. at 251-52.
5. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (1964):
The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of aliens within the United
States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of entry as aliens who
have sought to procure, or have procured visas or other documentation, or entry
into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation shall not apply to an alien
otherwise admissible at the time of entry who is the spouse, parent, or a child of
a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
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from the fraudulent concealment of his intentions. Petitioner sought
judicial review of the decision.6 Held: the deportation order directly
resulted from petitioner's fraudulent concealment of his intention to
remain permanently in the United States; therefore, even though he
did not enter the country on an immigrant visa, petitioner is eligible
for relief under § 1251(f) on the specific charge brought, if he was
otherwise admissible at time of entry.7 Muslemi v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 408 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1969).
Two conflicting cases involving aliens who had obtained immigrant
visas by fraud came before the United States Supreme Court in Errico
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. The aliens had evaded
existing immigration quota requirements. Subsequent to their entering
the United States, family ties were established with American citizens.'
The Court gave § 1251(f) a liberal interpretation in view of the
humanitarian intention of Congress to avoid separating families."0 In
applying § 1251(f) to aliens with prescribed family ties who by fraud
obtained immigrant visas, the Errico decision established (1) that
it does not matter if the specific charge in deportation proceedings
fails to allege fraud so long as but for some fraud no deportation pro-
ceedings would have been instituted," and (2) that evasion of quota
restrictions does not preclude an alien from being "otherwise admissible
at the time of entry." 2
6. The court's jurisdiction rests on Immigration and Nationality Act § 105(a)
8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1964).
7. The case was remanded to the Board to determine whether petitioner was other-
wise admissible at the time of entry.
8. 385 U.S. 214 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Errico]. The two cases were Errico v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 349 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1965) (granting relief);
and Scott v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 350 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1965)
(denying relief).
9. Both Mrs. Errico and Mrs. Scott had babies in the United States, making peti-
tioners in both instances parents of American citizens by that fact. Errico, 385 U.S. at
215-16.
10. For a thorough examination of the legislative history of the section see Note,
Immigration: The Criterion of "Otherwise Admissible" as a Basis for Relief from De-
portation because of Fraud or Misrepresentation, 66 CoLuM. L. REV. 188 (1966). See
also 34 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 351 (1965), and 42 ST. JoHNs's L. REV. 118 (1967).
11. Errico, 385 U.S. at 217. The court affirmed the administrative rule that § 1251(f)
"waives any deportation charge that results directly from the misrepresentation regard-
less of the section of the statute under which the charge was brought, provided that
the alien was 'otherwise admissible at the time of entry.'
12. Errico, 385 U.S. at 223:
The present § 1251(f) is essentially a re-enactment of § 7 of the 1957 Act. The
legislative history leaves no doubt that no substantive change in the section was
638
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The major factual distinction between Errico and Muslemi is that
the former involved aliens entering the United States on immigrant
visas whereas the latter involved an alien entering on a visitor visa.
The broad question posed by Muslemi is whether this difference in
the kind of documentation through which entry is fraudulently pro-
cured compels a result differing from Errico. By means of an extremely
narrow holding, the Muslemi court avoided providing an answer to
this broad question. The Muslemi opinion, relying on Errico, estab-
lished only the applicability of § 1251 (f) to the specific charge brought.
The case was remanded on the "otherwise admissible" issue without
guidance as to what disqualifying criteria should govern that issue
in the visitor visa context. This note explores whether the logic of
Muslemi supports extending § 1251(f) protection to nonimmigrants
as far as such protection was extended to immigrants in Errico.
Prior decisions, both administrative and judicial, have denied non-
immigrant aliens relief under § 1251(f).3 But these cases can be
distinguished from Muslemi in two respects. First, the issue of fraud
did not occupy the status of a finding of fact as it did in Muslemi (the
special inquiry officer so found). The cases were decided on other
grounds, and if fraud was mentioned, it was referred to only in dictum.
Where fraud was not mentioned, it cannot be known whether a fraud
issue may have been lurking in the background. In one case, an alien
did attempt to inject § 1251(f) into the proceedings by an assertion
that the deportation charge selected by the government was really the
result of fraud, but he was not allowed to do so.",
intended.. . . The intent of § 7 of the 1957 Act not to require that aliens who are
close relatives of United States citizens have complied with quota restrictions to
escape deportation for fraud is dear from its language, and there is nothing in
legislative history to suggest that Congress had in mind a contrary result.
Since Errico, determination that aliens are not "otherwise admissible" has been subject
only to qualitative (i.e. non-quota) standards. See Boutilier v. Immigration and Natu-
ralization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (homosexuality); Velasquez Espinosa v. Immi-
gration and Naturalization Serv., 404 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1968) (draft evasion); Matter
of Eng, 12 1. & N. Dec. 855 (1968) (narcotics offense). See also Langhanmer v. Hamil-
ton, 295 F.2d 642 (1st Cir. 1961) (Communist Party membership).
13. Cases include the following: Ntovas v. Ahrens, 276 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 826 (1960) (fraud at entry not proven); Tsaconis v. Immigration
and Naturalization Serv., 397 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1968) (no fraud at entry) ; Ferrante
v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 399 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1968) (no fraud at
entry); Matter of Cadiz, 12 I. & N. Dec. 560 (1968) (purpose in coming to the United
States was not family reunification) ; Matter of West, 12 I. & N. Dec. 683 (1968) (no
fraud at entry).
14. Ntovas v. Ahrens, 276 F.2d 483, 484 (7th Cir. 1960). There the court said:
639
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Second, the specific charge made against the aliens was not the same
as that made in Muslemi. Petitioner in Muslemi was ordered deported
on the ground that he was excludable at the time of entry as an im-
migrant without a valid immigrant visa, 5 whereas petitioners in the
other cases were ordered deported as nonimmigrants who overstayed
their temporary visas.1 6 Muslemi applied § 1251(f) explicitly only to
the charge in that case. The court said:17
We need not decide in general whether 1251 (f) saves aliens who
have fraudulently entered the country on nonimmigrant visas and
who have the requisite family ties from deportation on any charge.
We need decide only whether petitioner is saved from deportation
on the specific charge entered against him in this proceeding.
(Emphasis added.)
In using this language, the Muslemi court shunned comment on prior
decisions which have ordered deportation on the grounds of over-
staying temporary visas. But, if Muslemi can provide authority for
applying § 1251(f) to one deportation charge involving a nonimmi-
grant, there is no logical basis for differentiating between immigrants
and nonimmigrants with respect to applying §1251(f) to all charges
that directly result from misrepresentation or fraud. Implicit in Errico
is the point that the government should not be allowed to avoid
§ 1251(f) by a simple selection of charges.' No reason appears why
the government should be permitted to play the game by different
rules under Muslemi facts. Thus, a court using the Muslemi approach
ought to reach the Muselmi result when faced with a charge of over-
staying a temporary visa.
Further, if § 1251 (f) applies to all charges that directly result from
misrepresentation or fraud, an alien should on judical review have the
opportunity to show that the charge against him so resulted in order
In the administrative proceedings the ground selected and relied upon by the gov-
ernment was not fraud or misrepresentation and plaintiff has not the power to
substitute for his own convenience a ground not involved in the deportation pro-
ceedings. Whether or not he subjectively harbored an intent to commit fraud is a
matter between him and his conscience.
15. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (1964).
16. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2) (1964).
17. Muslemi v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 408 F.2d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir.
1969).
18. See Errico, 385 U.S. at 217.
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to eliminate the possibility of cases in which fraud, if raised and shown,
does not occupy the status of a finding of fact.
The Muslemi court remanded without hint of its view of the "other-
wise admissible" criteria, but Errico expressly eliminated quota eva-
sion as a disqualification for immigrants. Quota evasion may be the
aim of both immigrants and nonimmigrants, and anyone who has
successfully evaded the quotas, of course, may also have evaded ap-
plicable qualitative (non-quota) restrictions. In such cases pre-entry
screening has been defeated and only post-entry investigation can
detect qualitative shortcomings. Under Errico, immigrant aliens with
requisite family relationships who evade preliminary investigation are
not thereby prevented from being considered "otherwise admissible.' 19
Should, then, an alien who entered on a visitor visa not be "otherwise
admissible" because he failed to submit himself to the immigration
visa-issuing process in order to determine whether he had any non-
quota disqualification? This argument was used by the government
in 1967 in Matter of Lee.20
In that case, the Board granted relief under § 1251(f) to an alien
who had entered the United States on a false claim of citizenship. The
Board held that the charge of entry without inspection,"' directly re-
sulted from petitioner's misrepresentation at the time of entry, and
therefore, § 1251(f), as interpreted in Errico, operated to save the
petitioner.22 But, in a decision handed down on May 1, 1969, after the
Muslemi decision, the Attorney General reversed the Board in Matter
of Lee 3 He held that a person entering the country under a false claim
of citizenship is not saved by § 1251 (f) since it24
only encompasses fraud or misrepresentation committed by an
alien in the course of furnishing information or otherwise being
processed as required by our immigration laws.
The Attorney General very likely had the Muslemi situation in mind,
19. Id. at 223.
20. Interim Decision No. 1960 (1969). The Board reached its decision on June 2,
1967, and affirmed on August 13, 1967 after a rehearing.
21. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1964).
22. Interim Decision No. 1960 (1969).
23. Id. The case was referred to the Attorney General by the Board for review
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h)(1)(iii) (1969).
24. Interim Decision No. 1960 at 10 (1969).
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and his decision left little doubt as to the decision in Muslemi on
remand: 25
Most of the immigration requirements are waived for aliens who
come here as nonimmigrant visitors .... Consequently, an alien
who has evaded most of the immigration requirements by fraud
entering as a nonimmigrant visitor does not appear to be an other-
wise admissible immigrant.
The government's position is rationalized by the following con-
siderations: though the broad language of the statute would seem to
include nonimmigrants as well as immigrants,2 the legislative intent
of Congress, as interpreted by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, was not to include nonimmigrants within the statutory pro-
tection." Immigration is considered a privilege granted by the govern-
ment to aliens who wish to become permanent residents of the United
States.2" The government, in granting this privilege, has seen fit to
make it subject to both qualitative and quantitative standards.
Thorough screening and investigation of applicants for immigrant
visas is necessary to fulfill the requirements of the immigration laws.2
Nonimmigrants, while ostensibly subject to some qualitative standards,
are subject to no quantitative limitations and are, in fact, actively
encouraged to visit the United States by our government.30 Rigorous
investigation of applicants for a visitor visa is not only impractical,
but incompatible with the policy of encouraging visitors. In practice,
25. Id. at 10 n.4.
26. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (1964). The full
text of the subsection is set forth in note 5 supra.
27. See, e.g., Matter of Cadiz, 12 I. & N. Dec. 560 (1968). The special inquiry officer
felt that the plain language of the statute included nonimmigrants, but the Board, in-
terpreting the legislative history of § 1251(f), felt otherwise:
We do not believe it was ever contemplated or intended that [1251(f)] should
apply to fraud relating to a nonimmigrant entry. The history of this section . . .
shows that its purpose was to excuse deportability for fraud or misrepresentation
so that an alien need not be separated from his American citizen or resident alien
parents, spouse or children. . . . The misrepresentations constantly referred to were
. . . all material to entry or attempted entry for permanent residence. . . . Entry
as a nonimmigrant visitor by statutory definition, was not for the purpose of family
reunification ...
Id. at 562.
28. See Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
29. See 22 C.F.R. § 42 (1969); Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 221, 222, 8
U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202 (Supp. IV, 1968), amending 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202 (1964).
30. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMmIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDUiRE § 3.10a
at 3-65 (1967) for a general discussion of this encouragement.
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a visitor visa is often obtained on the day of application.31 Applying
§ 125 1(f) to nonimmigrants invites the circumvention of the immigrant
screening process, since there is no practical system capable of en-
couraging visitors and investigating them thoroughly at the same time. 2
Against these considerations urged by the government, the plight of
individuals should be weighed. It is as easy to condemn the quota
system as to condemn the alien's fraudulent actions. 3 In a world of
such inequality among nations that the relative affluence of one forces
it to erect barriers in order to keep citizens of less affluent countries
out, it is hard to blame an individual for merely wanting to better
his lot in life. And it is even harder to blame one when a familial
concern is involved. As interpreted by Errico, § 1251(f) provides a
legal vehicle for properly giving such individual/familial interests
consideration in the face of the general severity of the national quota
policy. 4 To deny nonimmigrants with the proper family ties relief
from deportation may result in the very hardship of family separation
against which Errico said § 1251 (f) was intended to stand.
The government has argued that applying § 1251(f) to non-
immigrants results in rewarding fraudV5 This is, of course, true. But
the same argument was accurately made as to immigrants in Errico.36
It did not prevail. The Supreme Court decided in favor of the indi-
viduals. In view of that decision, it is hard to see why the same reason-
ing should not apply to noninmigrants, who differ only in that they
gain admission to the country with a different set of papers. Indeed,
to impose one rule for immigrants and another for nonimmigrants is
to unjustifiably discriminate among different techniques of fraud. Take
31. Id.
32. The statutory scheme (see note 29 suPra) sets up detailed and time-consuming
procedures.
33. Determination of the number of aliens who would take advantage of § 1251(f)
is difficult since, after a court or Board decision is made, it is applied as a matter of
course in similar situations which arise thereafter. No appeals are necessary; conse-
quently, there are no records of the number of aliens the statute affects.
34. The .Errico court was very much concerned with interests of individuals. See
385 U.S. at 225. Muslemi goes Errico one better in this regard by suggesting that ro-
mance can conquer the quota system-indeed, a humane exception to an otherwise
Draconian law.
35. Brief for Respondent at 20-22, Muslemi v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
408 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1969).
36. lrrico, 385 U.S. at 226, 230 (Stewart, J., joined by Harlan & White, JJ., dis-
senting.)
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the example of two aliens, both of whom wish to become United States
residents, but cannot because of long waiting lists for immigration
visas. The first applies for preferential treatment as an immigrant and
is clever enough to get through the preliminary screening process. The
second obtains a visitor visa with the intention of finding a way to
remain in this country permanently once he arrives. Using the govern-
ment's rationale in Matter of Lee, the first, absent qualitative defects,
will be able to stay, while the second will be deported.
The screening process for alien immigrants who can avoid the
general quotas only eliminates those with non-quota disqualifications.
However, since Errico excepts quota evasion from the "otherwise ad-
missible" issue in § 1251(f) cases, the result is that only qualitative
restrictions can lead to deportation of an immigrant with proper family
ties who is already in this country." Such immigrants, then, can be
deported only if the screening process has failed. The government's
position in Matter of Lee that the nonimmigrant alien can be deported
because he evaded the screening process could as well apply to the
immigrant, but Errico forecloses the latter argument. In both situa-
tions the screening process has been defeated and in both situations
any further investigation must be conducted after entry. Since a non-
immigrant must go through a post-entry process in order to obtain
permanent United States residence,38 any qualitative shortcomings
could be spotted there.
Consequently, no sound reason appears why the question left open
by Muslemi should not be resolved for nonimmigrants in the same way
it was resolved for immigrants in Errico.
37. See note 12 supra.
38. See note 3 supra.
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